Sustainable Development Within Knowledge Democracies: An Emerging Governance Problem by Roeland Jaap in ’t Veld
Chapter 1
Sustainable Development Within Knowledge
Democracies: An Emerging Governance
Problem
Roeland Jaap in ’t Veld
Abstract Sustainable development is all over the place. The concept is broad and
vague. The vagueness of the concept has a Janus face. It has been called a unifying
concept because its vagueness breeds a consensus that might be utilised later on.
Vagueness is an asset if it triggers action. On the other hand, if sustainable develop-
ment is everything, maybe it is nothing. . . Although – or maybe because – the
concept is vague, it has overwhelming appeal on political agendas, programmes
and dialogues. The precautionary principle is the nucleus of a powerful moral
imperative. The multidimensional nature of the concept, covering ecological, eco-
nomic and social aspects of change relates to our needs for integration. Sustainable
development as a concept bears a persuasive character. Actors of all kinds may
contribute to it, citizens, enterprises, NGOs, governments et cetera.
Thinking about the governance of sustainable development leads us to the
recognition of a multi-level, multi-scale, multi-disciplinary character of the
problematique. Moreover, the term development refers to change, to transitions
and transformations. Governance of sustainable development therefore has to cope
with complex dynamics. This chapter deals with the specific consequences of
sustainability governance inside knowledge democracies. The concept of knowl-
edge democracy sheds new light on the emerging relationships between politics,
media and science. It shows how the emergence of participatory democracy besides
representative democracy, the revolutionary rise of social media besides corporate
media, the emergence of transdisciplinary trajectories besides classical disciplinary
science lead to explosions of complex interactions. We will digress upon the variety
of possible future variants of knowledge democracies, quiet and turbulent ones, in
relation to the quest for sustainable development. Our main conclusion will be that
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strategies for sustainability may vary with the types of knowledge democracies
around.
1.1 Introduction
Since the introduction of the concept of knowledge democracy with the meaning of
enabling a new focus on the relationships between knowledge production and
dissemination (in ’t Veld 2010a), the functioning of the media and the evolution
of our democratic institutions and processes, we have seen remarkable proof of the
vitality of the concept. The concept obliges us to realise that the institutional
frameworks of today’s societies may appear to be deficient as far as the
undercurrents, trends and other developments demand change. Reconsidering the
events in 2011 in the Maghreb, the Middle East and some other regions, the crucial
role of social media besides phenomena of participatory democracy demand our
attention.
Democracy is without any doubt the most successful governance concept for
societies during the two last centuries. It is a strong brand, even used by rulers who
do not meet any substantial democratic criterion. Representation gradually became
the predominant mechanism by which the population at large, through elections,
provides a body with a general authorisation to take decisions in all public domains
for a certain period of time. Representative parliamentary democracy became the
icon of advanced nation-states.
The recent decline of representative parliamentary democracy has been called
upon by many authors. On the micro-level the earlier consistent individual position
of an ideologically-based consistent value pattern has disappeared. The values are
present but the glue of a focal ideological principle is not any longer at stock.
Fragmentation of values has led to individualisation, to uniqueness but thereby also
to the impossibility of being represented in a general manner by a single actor such
as a member of parliament. More fundamentally media-politics destroy the original
meaning of representation. On the meso-level the development of political parties
to marketeers in the political realm destroys their capacity for designing consistent
broad political strategies. Like willow trees they move with the winds of the
supposed voters’ preferences. And on the macro-level media-politics dominate.
Volatility therefore will probably increase.
The debate on the future of democracy has not yet led to major innovations in
advanced national societies in Europe, contrary to sweeping innovation elsewhere.
Established political actors try to tackle populism with trusted resources: a combi-
nation of anti-populist rhetoric and adoption of the populist agenda. Some of the
media have responded by attempting to become ‘more populist than populists
themselves’, almost always at the expense of analytical depth. In other parts of
the world the longing for democracy leads to sweeping movements.
The development in different parts of the world partially points in a variety of
directions: city government in parts of South America is characterised by
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remarkable citizens’ participation in many cases, while in Asia the rule of law is
introduced without classical democracy in influential nations. The recent
developments in the Middle East still await thorough evaluation.
Meanwhile, the worldwide web as well as the evolution of social media provides
for a drastic change in the rules of the game. A better educated public has wide
access to information, and selects it more and more by itself, instead of relying on
media filters as produced by classical media. Moreover citizens themselves have
become media. They may produce, in some cases soon world-famous, YouTube
videos at home or down town. Even more, social media have to the surprise of many
shown to be of decisive importance in drastic changes of government and gover-
nance in several North-African states in 2011.
The relationships between corporate, top-down media and politics may change
considerably as a consequence of the rise of social media because politicians may
utilise social media in order to create direct communication with voters, so their
dependence on the top-down media diminishes. The corporate media are not any
longer the necessary, only intermediaries between politicians and voters. Neverthe-
less, people get tired of social media already too, because the latter produce also
much pulp, and the costs of finding trustworthy information are high; confusion and
ambiguity are all over the place. The crucial combination of a network society and
media-politics provides new problems and tensions. The political agenda is increas-
ingly filled with so-called wicked problems, characterised by the absence of
consensus both on the relevant values and the necessary knowledge and informa-
tion. Uncertainty and complexity prevail.
Today’s societies are characterised by an increasing intensity and speed of
reflexive mechanisms. Reflexive mechanisms in a more or less lenient political
environment cause overwhelming volatility of bodies of knowledge related to social
systems. As all available knowledge is utilised to facilitate reflexive processes, the
result of such processes might establish new relationships that undermine the
existing knowledge. Social reality has thus become unpredictable in principle.
Voß and Kemp in their introductory chapter to Reflexive Governance to Sus-
tainable Development (2006) deal with reflexivity and distinguish first- and second-
order reflexivity. First-order reflexivity
refers to how modernity deals with its own implications and side effects, the mechanism by
which modern societies grow in cycles of producing problems and solutions to these
problems that produce new problems. The reality of modern society is thus a result of
self-confrontation. (Voß and Kemp 2006: 6).
Second-order reflexivity concerns ‘the cognitive reconstruction of this cycle’.
It ‘entails the application of modern rational analysis not only to the self-induced
problems but also to its own working, conditions and effects’. It may be clear that
we mainly deal with second-order reflexivity in the terminology of Voß and Kemp.
The relationships between science and politics demand new designs in an
environment of media-politics, wicked problems and reflexivity. The classical
theory on boundary work as published by Jasanoff and others in order to master
the existing gaps between science and politics is nowadays widely accepted among
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experts. The underlying insight is that scientific knowledge by its very structure
never directly relates to action, because it is fragmented, partial, conditional and
immunised. This observation is valid for both mono- and multi- disciplinary
knowledge. Thus, translation activities are always necessary in order to utilise
scientific knowledge for policy purposes.
The literature on transdisciplinary research is dominated by process-directed
normative studies. It appears to me that the core concept of transdisciplinarity is to
be defined as the trajectory in a multi-actor environment from both sources: from a
political agenda and existing expertise, to a robust, plausible perspective for action.
In the third part of the chapter we reflect upon the specific consequences of the
mixing of governance of sustainability and knowledge democracies. The final part
of this chapter is devoted to observations on quiet and turbulent democracies as
very different typologies of potential evolutionary patterns of knowledge
democracy.
1.2 Sustainable Development
We consider our world through the veils of fundamental normative perspectives
that shape our beliefs, our inspiration and our actions. One of the many disputes
between Plato and Aristoteles concerned the question whether mankind is either
part of nature or has a subject-object relation to nature. The anthropocentric
character of the concept of nature became gradually stronger in the Western
world. The Christian religion defined the duty of men towards nature as steward-
ship, Verwalterstelle, but did seldom practice it. The era of Aufkl€arung, Enlighten-
ment has delivered the perspective of humankind as the master of the universe, with
the perspective of a world governed by reason and by science. But the shadow of
Faust was always near. More recently the metaphor of the exhaustion of the earth,
caused by human irresponsibility, has come to the forefront in disputes. Economic
growth then may be sinful. Perez-Carmona treats this issue more fundamentally in
Chap. 3 of this volume. On the other side of the spectre, commentators consider
technological innovation as the great liberator of the human race, because it will
eradicate poverty, hunger and many other shortcomings.
Statistics indicate that we on the average live longer and in better health than
ever before, but the pursuit of happiness relates to more than statistics. Our values
on distributive justice urge us to pay attention to differences. Many of the normative
perspectives on the environment are formulated in terms of threats that demand
immediate action. While increasing wealth appears to reduce the willingness to
accept risks of wealthy people, these threats are shaped as extreme risks.
It has been generally accepted nowadays that mankind is able to bring about
irreversible change that partially diminishes the options of future generations.
The normative insight derived from this principle is formulated as the precautionary
principle. This principle leads to the norm that we should abstain from action
that reduces the valuable future options for choice. Moreover the concept of
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sustainability now concerns the three major dimensions of human societies,
the economic, social and ecological dimension, collected as the three P’s people,
planet, profit. Van Londen and De Ruijter (2011: 10) define the concept of
sustainable development as the reconciliation of three imperatives: (a) the eco-
logical imperative, to remain within planetary bio-physical carrying capacity;
(b) the economic imperative, to ensure an adequate material standard of living;
and (c) the social imperative, to provide social structures – including systems of
governance – that effectively propagate and sustain the values that people want to
live by, in order to maximise human welfare.
The reconciliatory character of sustainable development raises specific
questions as to the judgment on changes that lead to improvement in two
dimensions but to deterioration in the third. Until now we lack a satisfactory
interdimensional measuring rod in order to judge upon this type of changes. This
deficiency is serious because as a consequence we are unable to provide convincing
criteria to judge upon policy options in a comparative manner.
Many different dialogues about sustainable development take place simulta-
neously: cities, states, enterprises and families discuss sustainable development in
their own specific environment. They use common words, but in various
rationalities. Sustainable development is a container notion. The use of the singular
form fits in holistic viewpoints. The supporters of these viewpoints speak about the
climate, the earth, the emissions, the planetary boundaries (Meuleman 2010b). All
of these are at stake, and disasters threaten. Such constructs enable us subsequently
to deal with a global challenge that should be met in a well-coordinated manner.
Thus, the normative construction of the problematique leads to a specific line of
argumentation on governance. The supporters of this view may be found in
international organisations that make continuous efforts to produce consensus on
international binding agreements, in order to prevent disasters. Basic metaphors
like the exhaustion of the earth, and planetary boundaries, then are very useful.
However, people do not experience the climate but a climate in the
neighbourhood. They pursue a good life according to their own values and in
many cases try to find a satisfactory relationship to the surrounding nature. Their
visible world is not abstract or systemic but specific and concrete. Likewise, until a
few years ago, climatologists distinguished many different climates. Entrepreneurs
make attempts to design and apply more sustainable technologies. They act in a
specific environment too, not in an abstract universe. So Perceptions are not only
context-bound but also acceptable ways of dealing with problematic issues. Thus,
major discrepancies may exist here between the systemic world on one hand and the
daily life world on the other.
The Western world has developed environmental policies during the last half
century. In the international realm younger nation-states, often former colonies,
more recently also become aware of the disagreeable side effects of economic
growth. They want to counterbalance these effects in their own manner. In the
diplomatic arena they however are confronted continuously with urgent calls to
participate in bargaining processes on treaties with the former colonial powers.
These partners now urge for dramatic reductions of emissions and the like. Quota
for a certain future year are symbols of urgency. The young nation that is coping
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with the need for reduction of backwardness in technologies and is just starting to
think about clean technologies will not feel inspired by the short term limits set by
others. It will experience those as unnatural.
Moreover, the language of international traditional diplomacy would not neces-
sarily be accepted by all relevant actors because some could interpret this language
as an expression of hegemony by former colonial powers. Cultural diversity should
be recognised both as a component of sustainability and as a complicating factor,
that prohibits progress in reaching consensus on collective action. Meuleman
devotes a chapter in this book to these questions (Chap. 2).
A society needs a certain cohesion, that is produced as a moral order, based on
consensus on some fundamental values and norms. Therefore, culture within a
society is also the sharing of some common substantial and relational values.
A society consists of configurations. A configuration possesses a specific culture
but as observed earlier, this leads to outside walls, and tensions arise. In particular
the tensions between emerging identities on one side, accompanied necessarily by
outer walls, and the need for cohesion and collective action on the other will never
disappear. Shaping governance thus is walking a high wire.
We should argue that biodiversity and cultural diversity both are components of
sustainability. We may mourn about the loss of a language somewhere on this globe
as about the loss of a species. But our general attitude towards cultural diversity in
daily practice is far more critical than towards biodiversity. We do not believe that
each culture is intrinsically good. On the contrary, some cultures are horrifying to
many. As sustainability also implies the economic and social dimension, we realise
that ‘diversity always is a bedfellow of inequality’ (Van Londen and De Ruijter
2011: 14). Inequality might be a threat to sustainable development, so our attitude
towards cultural diversity is ambiguous.
According to the concept of second modernity (Beck 1992) it is probable that
from the tense relations between emerging opposites variety increases. Striving at
sustainable development urges us to take these tensions fully into account when
dealing with governance.
Because sustainable development is a long range trajectory, with considerable
uncertainty and lack of forecasting options, the notion of resilience is crucial: like
Noah we can act sensibly without any certainty on future events by answering the
question how to avoid a disaster, in casu by building an Ark. Nowadays for instance
it is uncertain which theory on climate change is the right one, but once the theory
that allies climate change to carbon emissions is there, the justification of measures
to reduce emissions can be based on the resilience norm: in order to avoid disasters
we have to take into account the feasible theoretical viewpoints irrespective of our
beliefs.
Some supporters of strict environmental policies consider the sustainability
concept as a watered-down notion. Like T.S. Eliot (where is the wisdom we lost
in knowledge, where is the knowledge we lost in information?) they ask them-
selves: where is the attention for the environment we lost in sustainability?
We should realise in accordance with the view of Grunwald (2004), Grin (2006)
and others that the plurality of notions of sustainable development and their
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normative origins and connotations lead to the necessity of considering the recom-
mendable knowledge-producing and policy-making processes as reflexive.
In Grunwalds terminology:
The normative character of the imperative of sustainability, its inseparable connection with
deep-rooted societal structures and values, the long-term nature of many relevant
developments, as well as the often necessary inclusion of societal groups and actors, result
in specific demands on scientific problem-solving contributions. Research for sustainable
development is a particularly marked type of post-normal science (Funtowicz and Ravetz
1993: 151)
Therefore we will argue that dealing with reflexivity and transdisciplinarity are
necessary once we strive at sustainable development.
1.3 Knowledge Democracy
1.3.1 The Overwhelming Success of Democracy
In 2011 again sweeping moves may be observed, and loud outcries may be heard
demanding more democracy in different parts of the world. As we argued earlier
(in ’t Veld 2010a), democracy is the most successful governance concept for
societies as well as a strong brand. Even the most cruel dictatorships call themselves
democracies.
Democracy according to Abraham Lincoln is a very broad concept: ‘government
of the people, by the people and for the people’. Some centuries later Schumpeter
(1943) however defines it in a minimal manner:
[. . ..] the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive
struggle for the people’s vote.
From the Greek philosopher Plato onwards, (who inherited some insights from
the vedas) the continuous debates on the relative merits of democracy versus
aristocracy, of consensual versus majoritarian typologies of democracy, of
unicentric versus pluricentric concepts of democracy enrich our thinking.
In the course of the last two centuries, a group of related types of representative
constitutional democracy became the predominant format of the nation-state. It
enjoyed unheard popularity, and still does, all over the globe. All Western and most
Southern political leaders preach democracy as an all-healing recipe. Representa-
tion gradually became the predominant mechanism by which the population at
large, through elections, provides a body with a general authorisation to take
decisions in all public domains for a certain period of time.
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1.3.2 The Curse of Success
Figure 1.1 shows the essential classical characteristics of interactions. In the
twentieth century parliamentary democracy politics and media become more and
more mutually dependent, policies are increasingly funded in science, but at the
same time science gets more and more dependent on public resources, so that the
linkages between politics and science intensify.
The cognitive and emotional investments into the present democratic institutions
have been large. As a consequence the stability of these institutions is embraced.
However, exogenous as well as endogenous developments threaten the continua-
tion of success of representative parliamentary democracy.
The recent decline of the acceptance, the legitimacy and maybe also the effec-
tiveness of representative parliamentary democracy has been called upon by many
authors. Both Castells (1996, 2009) and Dahrendorf (2002) explicitly refer to the
rise of media-politics as a threat to democracy. The reciprocal structural depen-
dence of politicians and media then becomes the focal determinant of political
action. Their explanations are related to the waning role of political parties and the
migration of the political forum from parliaments to television studios. As a result
of the disappearance of compelling political ideologies, political parties have
started to behave like economic actors striving to maximise the number of future
voters: following sole economic marketing theory for as far as their position on the
political spectre is concerned. In the absence of consistent ideologies, the main
parties choose a position very close to their competitors, shrinking the program-
matic space dramatically. Therefore, voters complaining about the diminishing
choice options are right.
Three intertwining simultaneous developments have taken place on the macro-,









Fig. 1.1 Twentieth century relationships between politics, science and media
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of the individual citizen, the classical assumption of a consistent individual posi-
tion, based upon an ideologically-based consistent value pattern has disappeared.
The separate values are present but the glue of a focal ideological principle is often
not any longer at stock. Fragmentation of values has led to individualisation, to
uniqueness but thereby also to the impossibility of being represented in a general
manner by a single actor such as a member of parliament. None of the values
cherished by an individual may be unique, but the combination probably is. The
preference on behalf of individuals for partial representation by an NGO per value-
domain therefore is no mistake, but a logical evolution. On the meso-level the
development of political parties to marketeers, who try to optimise the future
number of votes in the political realm destroys their capacity for designing consis-
tent broad political strategies. They move with the winds of the supposed voters’
preferences. And on the macro-level media-politics dominate. As a consequence
the epicentre of politics is shifting from parliament to the media. Media can handle
personalities better than programmes.
Personalities instead of programmes become the most important discriminating
factor and therefore the voters choose personalities. In the attempt to maximise the
number of voters, political parties are keen to use the media, as it is merely possible
to actually ‘sell’ personalities through mass media. This of course significantly
increases the structural dependence of politicians on the mass media. Media and
politics, a relationship based on mutual interest as on the other hand the media
equally need politicians in order to produce news, one of their main products. So
this dependence is reciprocal. The central position of the media – networks in
themselves – with their natural focus on the production of news, causes the political
debate to become superficial and short-term oriented. The classical function of
democracy to protect the people against tyranny and random or arbitrary action by
rulers is endangered by the stress on personalities instead of programmes. More
fundamentally media-politics destroy the original meaning of representation.
As Castells (2009) points out,
It is not improbable that people will utilise their vote at general elections to show disgust or
disapproval, more than revealing their preference for the favourite representative.
To his judgement, representation does not any longer produce a sustainable
mandate for the representative. It does merely register an instantaneous picture
of disgust at the moment of elections, timeless, without any meaning for future
trust, and certainly not for a longer time span. Volatility therefore will probably
increase.
The arguments in some attempts to gain insight in the consequences of the
decline of democracy, point at the under-institutionalised global developments
characterised by the increasing predominance of global economic conglomerates
and accompanied by the rise of a new global elite. Other comments indicate that
new communication technologies create virtual worlds and weaken the relevance of
a physical stable territory. The notion of state, of territory, of society, of sovereignty
and therefore of democracy appear to be endangered. ICT and mass media are
identified by the above-mentioned analysts as threats for the political realm with a
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specific negative influence on political representation as media-politics develop. All
these trends appear to cause the gradual disappearance of checks and balances,
among which adequate protection against arbitrary or random political action. We
will digress upon these options later. Another group of far more optimistic experts
indicates that ICT enables new types of democracy that could prove to deliver
adequate countervailing powers against the just listed threats.
The debate on the future of democracy in advanced European States has not yet
led to major innovations. Established political actors try to tackle populism with
trusted resources: a combination of anti-populist rhetoric and adoption of the
populist agenda.
We are aware that the development in other parts of the world partially point in
another direction: city government in South America is characterised by remarkable
citizens’ participation in many cases, while in Asia the rule of law is introduced
without classical democracy in important nations.
However, recent changes add to the complexity of the relations mentioned so far.
1.3.3 Wide Access to Information for Everyone
As Fig. 1.2 shows, we envisage a world now in which representative democracy is
supplemented with, not replaced by participatory democracy, in which social media
are added to classical corporate top-down media, and in which disciplinary science
is increasingly accompanied by transdisciplinary trajectories. The evolutionary
patterns in each corner of the triangle are not without tensions: the inner institutions
feel threatened by the younger, outer ones. Each of the corners in the triangle is
prone to profound change, indicated in the second-order relationships:
• The bottom-up media do not only supplement the classical media, but also
compete with them.
• Participatory democracy is complementary to representative democracy but is
also considered as a threat to the latter.
• Transdisciplinary design or research is not only a bridge between classical
science and the real world but also produces deviant knowledge and insights,
in some cases hostile to the disciplinary viewpoints.
The evolution of the worldwide web and the mobile phone, as well as the
evolution of social media provide for a drastic change in the rules of the game.
Acts of harassment on weblogs become political facts; virtual allegations become
unchecked urban myths and pressure groups design increasingly easier ways to find
endorsement on the internet. US president Obama’s campaign was trendsetting for
the latter.
Internet, better education and other societal changes have made knowledge
accessible to many more people than in the past. This leads to an abundance of
knowledge and information that needs to be interpreted. It also leads to different
types of knowledge: not only scientific knowledge appears to be relevant, but also
citizens’ knowledge. This is a huge challenge for policy-makers, for scientists and
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for the media. Politics is not just about how knowledge can be selected for political
decisions, but also about how democratic decision-making processes should change
in order to incorporate the different types of knowledge adequately.
A majority of the population now utilises social media. Castells (2009) speaks
about ‘mass self communication’. Moreover, citizens themselves have become
media: any citizen may produce a YouTube video that becomes famous in a few
days: icons in political turmoil with great political momentum may be created by
amateurs, as the recent events in Iran in 2010 already showed us. The Maghreb and
Middle East uprisings in 2011 were influenced decisively – according to many
observers – by social media. The classical media suffer from the new ones: not only
in a commercial sense, but also because of the influence of the new media. We call
the new media the bottom-up media in order to distinguish them from the classical
media, the top-down media. This distinction does not imply that the top is more
powerful than the bottom. An increasing series of empirical counterproofs is
available.
Many of the new media do not know an editing function: nobody accepts the
obligation to select the rubbish from the trustworthy materials. This results in very
high costs for the recipient of the information in order to make the aforementioned
selection. The developments in and with the media are confusing. Our capacity to
observe appears deficient. Information and knowledge of very different origins are
available within a second but it is hard to judge upon quality. As usual in second
Fig. 1.2 Two orders of tensions (After in ’t Veld 2010a: 11)
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modernity the top-down media do not disappear altogether but develop innovative
strategies, accepting internet options and modes of cooperation with social media.
The social media are in the process of discovering their own deficiencies, and in
some cases organise a revival of editorial functions.
The wicked character of many problems on the political agenda sheds a
fascinating light on the complexities caused by the interaction of top-down and
bottom-up media. Inclusion and exclusion get new dimensions: while the Dutch
authorities promoted a campaign of vaccination in order to protect young girls
against future cervical cancer in the official media, the target group itself
communicated on MSN Messenger, including series of very negative rumours.
A woman in a flower shop started a website that got more hits for some time than
the aggregate number of hits for all websites of Dutch ministries. This website
produced very negative information on vaccination in general, and sketched con-
siderable risks. As a consequence a large part of the target group refused vaccina-
tion. Like ships in the night, the different streams of information passed each other.
Thus important real life consequences came forward from this multiplicity of
information channels and content.
As mentioned above, we can distinguish ‘top-down media’ and ‘bottom-up
media’. Both contribute to the agenda setting of politics. The top-down media
operate in structural interdependency with politics. The expression ‘media-politics’
is devoted to this interdependency. The bottom-up media are to a considerable
degree independent from both the top-down media and politics. Participation in
decision preparation and -making may be invited by public authorities, but unin-
vited participation takes place too, in particular with support of bottom-up media.
We are not in the position yet to draw consolidated conclusions on this develop-
ment: it is fluid, it is fast, and it is reflexive itself so also unpredictable.
1.3.4 From Knowledge Economy to Knowledge Democracy
During the last decade, an influential debate was conducted on the ‘knowledge-
based economy’. This concept even became the main policy objective of the
European Union, the Lisbon Strategy. However, there are signs that the strength
of the argument for the knowledge-based economy is weakening rapidly. The
current worldwide economic crisis leads to new, very challenging questions.
These questions refer mainly to the institutional frameworks of today’s societies.
It is therefore time for a transition to a new concept that concentrates on institu-
tional and functional innovation. As the industrial economy has been combined
with mass democracy through universal suffrage and later by the rise of mass
media, one might suggest that the logical successor of knowledge economy is a
new type of governance, to be called ‘knowledge democracy’.
Which challenges and threats will we be facing? How will the respectable
parliamentary and new direct forms of democracy mix, and which roles will
knowledge play in the transition towards a knowledge democracy? The crucial
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combination of a network society and media-politics provides new problems and
tensions. Earlier we concentrated upon the roles of knowledge and information in
today’s democracies. We further developed the concept of knowledge democracy
in order to analyse whether we might be able to deal with these problems and
tensions. Now we want to discover what new tensions are arising once we practice
knowledge democracy.
Today policy-making in many instances is evidence- or knowledge- based,
providing both legitimacy and effectiveness, according to the supporters. Effective-
ness is assured as the knowledge concerns true statements on the relationships
between political interventions and their societal effects, so is their claim worded.
Legitimacy according to them is furthered when the policies are based upon the
‘objective’ truth. It is not difficult to undermine this belief.
Scientific research is a specific form of research, aimed at the creation or
accumulation of scientific knowledge. Classical scientific research is performed
within disciplines, specialised branches of science with specific theories and
methodologies. This monodisciplinary knowledge is formalised in a particular
way methodologically: it is for example subject to peer review. It is often put into
a rule-based form, such as: ‘A implies B’ in a particular set of circumstances,
whenever these circumstances occur. Such an assertion is known as a hypothesis.
‘The more a child participates in sports, the less likely the child is to turn to drugs’,
is a statement which could originate from empirical research and which probably
holds true for white families in European cities from 1990 to the present time. But
not for rural areas in Colombia. And why should this statement hold true for the
future? Scientific knowledge is therefore by definition both fragmented and condi-
tional. Its scientific value is dependent on the correct application of the agreed
methodology. Scientific knowledge lays claim to validity and is a protection against
criticism. What we are talking about here is what is called ‘normal research’.
It is difficult to integrate different areas of scientific knowledge because scien-
tific knowledge is by its very nature fragmented. And its conditional character
means that in order to apply the knowledge in real-world situations, it is necessary
to verify whether the conditions set have been complied with. In terms of the future,
this question can never be definitively answered. This means that every application
of social scientific knowledge for the purpose of policy bears an element of risk.
If a policy-maker – in the course of preparing policy proposals – wishes to apply
an assertion which is based on a rule, such as ‘for every X, under condition Y: A
implies B’, she first has to verify:
• ‘Is the X that I am talking about the same X as in the assumption?’
• ‘Are the conditions which I am faced with the same as the Y in the assumption?’
• ‘Is there really an A in my situation?’
• ‘Will the implication still apply at the time when the policy is implemented?’
In particular the last question is a nasty one because the consciousness of
reflexivity urges us to wonder whether the drug dealers might have reflected upon
the research results too, and might have ensured for themselves a position in the
boards of the sports clubs.
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This implies that applying scientific knowledge in policy does not always and
should not follow the accepted route of meeting the methodological requirements
which applied when the knowledge in question was developed. The application of
scientific knowledge in a political and governmental context is an exercise in
uncertainty, partly based on suppositions and it also requires competences other
than scientific ones, such as social intelligence and well-developed social intuition.
It appears necessary to link scientific knowledge to other types of insights without
detracting from its relevance and usefulness. Combining knowledge from different
scientific disciplines and mixing it with other insights is an opportunity to try to
maintain the relevance and usefulness of such knowledge in the relevant applica-
tion. Multi-, inter- and transdisciplinary developments in research are in full swing.
Anyone who realises this, cannot fail to be impressed by the speculative nature of
many elements of the methods used. The precision of a great deal of scientific
knowledge very soon gets lost in these methods. Robust concepts are often unrefined.
As Silvio Funtowicz has explained over and over again, this image of evidence
based policies based upon ‘sound’ knowledge is not adequate according to the
advanced science model. We will elaborate upon this later.
Let us now state that knowledge on social systems by definition is volatile as a
consequence of the reflexivity we will discuss below. The predominant position of
wicked problems on political agenda’s as indicated earlier is the main cause that
linear problem solution strategies cannot be used. Wicked problems cannot be
solved, they can be managed. In many cases interactive processes are part of
effective management. Elements of participatory democracy as well as transdisci-
plinarity may be involved, to be dealt with later on.
1.4 Reflexivity
Today’s societies are characterised by an increasing intensity and speed of reflexive
mechanisms. I define reflexive mechanisms as events and arrangements that bring
about a redefinition of the action perspectives, the focal strategies of the groups and
people involved, as a consequence of mindful or thoughtful considerations
concerning the frames, identities, underlying structures of themselves as well as
other relevant stakeholders. Defined in this manner, reflexivity has to do with a
particular kind of learning potential. Reflexive systems have the ability to re-
orientate themselves and adapt accordingly based on available self-knowledge.
Reflexive mechanisms in a more or less lenient political environment cause
overwhelming volatility of bodies of knowledge related to social systems. As all
available knowledge is utilised to facilitate reflexive processes, the result of such
processes might establish new relationships that undermine the existing knowledge.
Social reality has then become unpredictable in principle. The efficacy of reflexive
mechanisms is furthered by institutional arrangements that enable individual liberty
and tolerance.
In a tyrannical environment reflexive learning may take place, but it is not
spontaneously transformed into a change in behaviour because that change
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probably is illegal, and severely punished. Insofar as tyranny is negatively
correlated with democracy, a democratic environment will prove to be more apt
for reflexivity. Extreme profiles in courage however do show behavioural
consequences of reflexive learning in tyrannical environments (for example
Havel, Mandela).
It is necessary to develop this notion of reflexive learning further because it is of
utmost importance for the design of an advanced way of thinking on policy-making:
we should realise that a social theory of any kind may never be used to create policy
measures without an additional research effort on the specific issue. Such an effort
should include the question whether it is probable or plausible that the theory is
already undermined by reflexive reactions in or around the target group of the
measure. This latter effort will never deliver results with an absolute truth claim.
Uncertainty is overwhelmingly present there too. The policy dialogue will then be
characterised by different layers of uncertainty, and so by a discussion on the
impact of the different layers of uncertainty too.
Evidence-based policy-making as a normative concept probably bears some
relevance when it concerns the application of a physical, chemical or biological
scientific theory. But it becomes a hazardous pretention if the decision support
comes from a theory in the social sciences for the reasons just explained. In
particular the claims of economics in important fields as education and health are
sometimes preposterous. More modesty would fit once the complexity jump that
results from reflexive systems is internalised by the expert. Thus, the fashionable
approach towards evidence-based policies in social domains should be moderated
in a more modest and thoughtful framework.
Knowledge democracy could become an emerging concept with political, ideo-
logical and persuasive meaning. The analogy with the concept of knowledge
economy is clear: the latter brought political attention for the economic meaning
of research and development, a focus on the quality of education and political
support for larger public budgets for the domains under consideration. The human
capital theory – although deficient from a scientific point of view – became the
predominating policy paradigm in educational policies.
The concept of knowledge economy has developed as a rather vague persuasive
notion concerning the relationships between advanced research and education on
one hand and economic prosperity on the other. The ‘container’-character of the
concept has not prohibited favourable effects. It has proven to cause a more
conscious approach to the relationships between knowledge production and dis-
semination on one hand and economic innovation on the other. Education has been
recognised fully as a crucial factor in the pursuit of economic progress.
The concept is meant to enable a new focus on the relationships between
knowledge production and dissemination, the functioning of the media and our
democratic institutions. The emerging concept of knowledge democracy moreover
obliges us to realise that the institutional frameworks of today’s societies may
appear to be deficient insofar as the above mentioned undercurrents, trends and
other developments demand change. We explored the directions for institutional
change during the conference.
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In the perspective of new relationships between politics, media and science also
classical problems demand new solutions: the concept of knowledge democracy
concerns a problematique that relates to the intensification of knowledge in politics.
I developed a heuristic scheme in order to think more accurately about the
bottlenecks that threaten optimal trajectories between the realm of politics,
policy-making and useful research (Fig. 1.3). The thunderbolts show possible
bottlenecks in the processes of articulation of the demand for knowledge, as well
as the utilisation of knowledge, for instance:
• The actual political agenda may not correspond with the existing policy theories
that are either laid down in existing policies, legal systems budgeting rules et
cetera and/or are embraced by the top civil servants.
• The translation of policy questions in knowledge demand may prove to be
extremely difficult, for instance because the policy objectives bear a symbolic
character, or because the policy questions are wicked in nature, lacking under-
lying consensus on values.
• Inconvenient truth, newly produced knowledge that attacks the existing policy
theories, will probably not be applied in policy-making.
Fig. 1.3 Bottlenecks between the realm of politics, policy-making and useful research (After in ’t
Veld [Ed.] 2000/2009)
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• Research will produce knowledge in the future but the need is urgent, and the
political agenda is slightly volatile so there is a general problem of timeliness. In
order to recognise the time lags just described on one hand and the legitimate
demand for useful new knowledge on the other we should attempt to design the
policy agenda in the near future instead of only the present one, but that is a
dangerous activity.
The aforementioned bottlenecks can be reformulated as problems that demand a
solution or at least improvements.
The media are far from neutral or passive. The illusion that they are a neutral
mirror of reality belongs to a forgotten past. We have already shed light on the
relationships between politics and media. Media create realities, they also produce
knowledge, and moreover report on citizens’ knowledge. They are the reporters on
scientific findings but also competitors of scientists. The same goes for the
relationships between media and citizens. This increasing complexity demands
efforts in order to gain insight. Other important questions are for instance:
• How do media deal with scientific knowledge, and in particular how do they
select the new knowledge to be reported on from the vast supply of new
knowledge?
• How can scientific knowledge and citizens’ science both be utilised in processes
within politics?
• How can conflicts between both types of knowledge be solved?
• How do supervisors and regulators deal with citizens’ science?
A number of questions concerning the functioning of the democratic institutions
themselves as far as application of knowledge is concerned are very relevant:
• How do parliaments deal with different types of knowledge?
• How do parliaments not only use but also produce knowledge?
• Is parliamentary research to be trusted since parliamentary research committees
never lose their power orientation?
• How do parliaments deal with their dependence on information from ministries?
• Which challenges and threats will we be facing? How will parliamentary and
new direct forms of democracy mix, and which roles will knowledge play in the
transition towards a durable and sustainable knowledge democracy?
In the framework of a knowledge democracy this scheme becomes far more
complicated: the policy-knowledge interaction is not any longer restricted to the
official political institutions but spreads inevitably over society as a whole: citizen’s
groups and initiatives develop viewpoints over any major issue. Moreover citizens
utilise social media independent from authorities either in order to mobilise support
for ideas, or to attack existing policy theories. Science is involved in fierce
competition, in continuous marketing efforts in order to gain support for
viewpoints, based upon research, aiming at the acquisition of public resources for
further research. Advocacy coalitions between the proponents of a certain policy
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theory, the scientific representatives of related scientific theoretical viewpoints, and
sympathetic NGOs and citizen’s initiatives are borne, live and disassemble later on.
1.5 Transdisciplinarity
Much valuable scientific work has been performed on the relationships between
science and politics, in order to answer the last question partially. Jasanoff and
others have argued that it would be wise to design an independent boundary
function in order to foster the quality of the translation. The classical theory on
boundary work in order to master the existing gaps between science and politics is
nowadays widely accepted among experts. The underlying insight is that scientific
knowledge by its very structure never directly relates to action, because it is
fragmented, partial, conditional and immunised. This observation is valid for both
mono- and multi- disciplinary knowledge. Thus translation activities are always
necessary in order to utilise scientific knowledge for policy purposes. Pohl, Scholz,
Nowotny, Regeer and Bunders, and many others have explored this vast domain
and developed the concept of transdisciplinarity in a number of variations.
The literature on transdisciplinary research is dominated by process-directed
normative studies. Many authors suggest that transdisiciplinary research is just a
specific category of scientific research, characterised by the acceptance of some
normative bases for scientific reasoning. Here another viewpoint is defended: it
appears clear that the core concept of transdisciplinarity is to be defined as the
trajectory in a multi-actor environment, a trajectory that leads from two sources: a
political agenda and existing scientific expertise, to a robust, plausible perspective
for action. This trajectory bears the character of a communicative and argumenta-
tive process. Funtowicz’s later models contain both solutions and caveats on this
thorny road.
The terminology of the main authors is still more hesitant and still bears the word
‘research’ in the title. It appears fair, however, to acknowledge that the core activity
of transdisciplinarity is design, more than research. Researchers of course may
contribute to design. Figure 1.4 illustrates the twofold tense relationships between
the corners of the triangle. The original, inner institutional framework was fit for the
application of the fruits of disciplinary science, in order to solve rather simple
policy problems within the framework of representative democracy. Society was
ordered clearly in terms of ideological patterns and classical top-down media
fulfilled their roles. The first-order relationships show this picture. The second
order relationships describe the evolution of each corner. As a consequence of
that evolution we are confronted with tensions, threats and opportunities around the
outer corners of the triangle that are indicated in third-order relationships. As we
may observe the outer points of the extended triangle also strengthen and stimulate
each other. Transdisciplinarity nears participatory democracy, and social media
play crucial roles in large scale communication processes. So the tensions relate
mainly to the inside-outside relations in the triangle while the stimuli relate to the
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outer point of the corners. Hardly any empirical research is available here yet.
Figure 1.5 shows some of the relations between each inner and each outer corner.
This type of relations also has far reaching consequences for the governance of
sustainable development in knowledge democracies. These fourth order relations
might prove to be very diversified: for instance, bottom-up media might be utilised
by representative democracy but also cause conflicts as shown in the case study on
vaccination mentioned above. Citizen’s initiatives might internalise fruits of disci-
plinary science, but also application problems might be caused by it. Top-down
media might orga-nise transdisciplinary trajectories, but they could prove to be
boomerangs for those media themselves, et cetera.
In any society, a wide diversity of actors possesses relevant knowledge
concerning important societal problems. In a knowledge democracy both dominant
and non-dominant actors could and maybe should have equal access and ability to
put this knowledge forward in the process of solving societal problems. We did
already explain why disciplinary knowledge on its own is not fit to solve broader
societal problems.
During the past centuries the specialisation tendency dominated in science,
destroying the practical meaning of the uomo universale, and leading to more and
more disciplines and sub-disciplines. Sometimes innovation was brought about by
new combinations of those, called multi-disciplinary or interdisciplinary coopera-
tion or even mergers. According to the earlier terminology, transdisciplinary
Fig. 1.4 The emergence of the knowledge democracy concept
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research developed during the 1980s and early 1990s of the past century. Multidis-
ciplinary and interdisciplinary research than can be placed in a continuum between
monodisciplinary research and transdisciplinary research. Klein (2001: 7) at the
start of this century defined transdisciplinarity as:
A new form of learning and problem-solving involving co-operation between different
parts of society and science in order to meet complex challenges of society. Transdisciplin-
ary research starts from tangible, real-world problems. Solutions are devised in collabora-
tion with multiple stakeholders.
So she already states that cooperation and mutual learning are key notions in
transdisciplinary trajectories.
It is doubtful whether it is fair to describe transdisciplinarity as research. The end
product of the cooperation is an action perspective, not a truth claim. Not validity
but plausibility, social robustness and support are the decisive criteria. From the
perspective of knowledge democracy, we can distinguish two important dimensions
in transdisciplinary approaches:
• The degree of knowledge input of lay groups that is included in a specific
transdisciplinary project and
• The degree in which non-dominant actors are explicitly involved in the decision-
making of the development process of policies or research agendas.
Fig. 1.5 Old and new forms co-exist and influence each other
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This results in two different styles of transdisciplinary approaches. We discuss
the similarities and differences of these different styles and approaches. We con-
clude this paragraph with a discussion on transdisciplinary research styles in
relation to forms of democracy – on the one hand basic and representative democ-
racy and on the other hand deliberative democracy.
Transdisciplinary efforts are embedded in local scientific, cultural and political
practices that are differentiated in varied cultures and governance styles. Based on
the wide diversity of transdisciplinary efforts we can ask the following questions:
what similarities and differences of these programmes are relevant from the per-
spective of knowledge democracy? Which specific characteristics need to be
analysed if we want to understand how transdisciplinary efforts can contribute to
the process of knowledge democratisation? An initial look reveals a difference in
time scales. We have examples of transdisciplinary research processes that take
only a few months (for example, some consultation exercises), while there are also
programmes that take over 10 years, and all options in between. The methods and
tools used also appear to be quite diverse. Regarding involvement of non-scientific
actors for example, they range from interviews to group sessions in all kinds of
designs (focus groups, expert meeting, dialogues, citizen juries et cetera).
Notwithstanding these differences, we observe following Bunders et al. 2010,
that in scholarly literature the core of transdisciplinary research is most often
presented as a shared set of principles. Principles differ from theories, methods,
tools and conditions because they refer to the attitudes of the researcher-participant;
the researcher is said to perform genuine transdisciplinary research as long as he or
she acknowledges and acts in accordance with the intention of these principles.
These principles relate to process demands like joint problem definition, orientation
towards robust action perspectives, et cetera. As such, a set of principles describes
the intentions that guide the researcher in choices he or she has to make for the
design of the project or programme, which is the choice of methods, tools and the
sequence of these. In other words, ‘the approach’ is the manner in which the issue at
stake is approached. This is in line with the wide-spread convention of labelling
specific realisations of transdisciplinary research as ‘approaches’.
If one concentrates on the essentials of transdisciplinarity as communication and
argumentation, the demands for specific attitudes and even principles concerning
the other participants besides researchers are as crucial. The policy-makers will
tend to accept those scientific viewpoints that are closely related to the predominant
policy theory if present. They however should develop a certain willingness to open
up for other scientific insights because the aim of the exercise could be to end up
with resilient proposals, having answered the question how to avoid disasters. This
demands a sophisticated degree of reflexivity on their part.
Once all participants are touched by the need for mutual adapting, learning and
the common goal of a resilient design, the transdisciplinary process could really be
successful in the sense of supporting sustainable development. Considering the
existing literature one might observe that these conditions are seldom fulfilled.
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1.6 Governance of Sustainable Development in Knowledge
Democracies
Knowledge democracies are examples of second modernity: they develop in evo-
lutionary patterns characterised by tense relationships between opposite
institutions: participatory democracy besides representative democracy, social
media besides corporate media, transdisciplinarity besides disciplinary science,
and not instead of! The outer corners of the evolving triangle seem to reinforce
each other: social media enable participatory democracy, while some categories of
transdisciplinarity demand participatory democracy to a certain degree also.
Sustainable development is also profoundly related to second modernity:
fragmegration and glocalisation illustrate tense relations that characterise the
dynamics. It is a fundamental transition or transformation. It is a multi-scale,
multi-level, multi-aspect problematique. Transition demands restructuration in
the landscape-regime-niches environment. Sustainable development knows a num-
ber of wicked problems. Uncertainty and complexity prevail besides lack of
consensus both on values and on knowledge. Wicked problems cannot be solved
by hierarchical order, but can be managed in a multi-actor environment. Finally,
sustainable development is a long term problematique that demands long term
decisions. This type of decisions – dependent on the structure of the problem –
either demands an attitude of persistence or of resilience.
Because of reflexivity exogenous steering impulses are not effective in the long
run unless the values that determined the steering actions are internalised by the
social system under consideration. So exogenous interventions in general are
deficient. We should instead start to think about intraventions as principles of
governance. These again point in the direction of participatory democracy, but
now considered as a condition for effectiveness. The great governance institutions
‘hierarchy’, ‘market’ and ‘network’ will be amalgamated in a slightly different way
in knowledge democracies that aim at transitions: the different actors should move
in a manner that can be described as congruency.
Governance of sustainable development should not overconcentrate on global
binding environmental agreements as the major tool for progress. The transaction
costs of these agreements are often very high, and their effectiveness is often
deficient. Second modernity points to regional treaties besides global ones, volun-
tary agreements besides binding ones, local programmes besides national ones, city
developments besides nation-state ones. Moreover, we could design all kinds of
private-public arrangements that could stimulate both technological evolution in a
favourable direction and unify forces towards societal evolution in a sustainable
direction.
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1.7 Future Perspectives
In this final paragraph I formulate my insights concerning the predominant tensions
and challenges that have to be envisaged: concentrated in the question whether
democracies – and more in particular knowledge democracies – can participate
favourably to the governance of sustainable development. It is already hard to
imagine how the evolutionary tendencies in politics, media and science that all lead
to more multiplicity, uncertainty and lack of traditional legitimacy and authority,
will have to be coped with simultaneously, and sustainable development is one of
these extremely complex and vague issues.
We have proposed to replace the concept of knowledge economy by that of
knowledge democracy as a focal item of global agendas. The purpose is to illustrate
the necessity to respond to the actual evolutionary patterns of advanced societies.
These patterns are interwoven technological and social complex transitions in the
triangle politics-science-media. Of course the concept has a persuasive nature. We
have fabricated the triangle politics-media-science in order to illuminate the
connections and tensions between them. The analysis by Turnhout (2010) on the
character of the concept knowledge democracy, leading to the conclusion that it is
potentially both utopian and totalitarian should be properly interpreted as an early
warning signal. Applications of institutional and procedural requirements in knowl-
edge democracies, such as participatory decision-making processes, should contin-
uously be tested in the contingent environments of empirical reality. The danger of
totalitarian and technocratic misadventures is always present, but accidents can be
avoided if one is prepared to take a careful look into the value patterns of all
concerned actors. This danger is reinforced once more as we realize that sustainable
development itself is also persuasive, that it easily might be utopian too. And if we
would accept some of the suggestions that due to planetary boundaries and other
threats, the command to lead to sustainable development could also bear a totali-
tarian character itself. Therefore there is ample reason for a lot of attention on
arrangements that could fight hasty hypes and other uttering of ultra- persuasive
politics. Moreover the present dangers once more underline the necessity of
diversified approaches and plurality of methods.
Public authorities within systems of representative democracy are facing legiti-
macy and effectiveness problems. Representation in its historical shape has eroded
because of structural changes in value patterns, and because of the educational level
of the population. Legitimacy and effectiveness of governing and steering in a
classical manner are fundamentally undermined.
Politicians are far from stupid. They have designed lots of strategies in order to
cope with the recently emerged complications. The phenomenon of the spin doctor
with the unique assignment to bend available knowledge and information in a
favourable direction, and if necessary to provide useful information – invented or
not – was temporarily successful until the increasing revulsion of spin doctors
enforced them to go under cover. Politicians themselves participate massively in
social media. More refined practices have developed in order to influence the so
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called independent audits and evaluations of public policies and programmes by
selecting experts who supposedly would give a positive judgement.
Another category of the strategies of these public authorities in order to regain
legitimacy is the introduction of citizen participation. Often it remains completely
unclear whether this participation should contribute to either the collection of
support or to the process of enriching the content of the decision. This is important
because the preferable shape of the processes will depend upon the objectives of the
participation.
When we think about participatory democracy we usually refer to notions like
civil society, stakeholders-citizens, interested parties, et cetera. In the context of
deliberation or participation around a certain issue some public authority usually
decides who the desirable partners are. This type of ‘guided participation’ is often
tolerated if the boundaries of an invited group are experienced as ‘logical’. How-
ever the framing of the problem is decisive for the acceptance of the ‘logic’.
Media play crucial roles in any democracy. We have elaborated upon the
tensions and other interactions between top-down and bottom-up media earlier in
this chapter, and stressed the point that much is still unknown. In September 2010
for instance, the Chair of Dutch parliament suggested the members of parliament to
abstain from the use of Twitter during parliamentary debate, because the different
streams of information – the official debate in parliament and the Twitter stream-
would be ‘unmanageable’. From the viewpoint of checks and balances, and taking
into account the fact that we live in a world where frequently too much rather than
too little information is available, the key role of the media requires a certain degree
of self-reflection regarding the presentation of scientific and other policy-relevant
knowledge. The question stays, if both top-down and bottom-up media are able to
fulfill such a requirement. As Stephan Jungurt explains in this volume, we should
refine our viewpoints with respect to bridging gaps between science and policy in
the context of international decision-making on sustainable development.
The process of formulating research agendas becomes increasingly important in
a knowledge democracy. It cannot any longer be left to scientists alone. Broad
participation is desirable. For assessing the need and usefulness of the generation of
knowledge by policy oriented research programmes, more reflection in advance is
needed. Knowledge democracy therefore appears to demand at least twofold
complex participation processes: the transdisciplinary character is necessary to
transform scientific insights to robust, plausible action perspectives, and the contri-
bution of stakeholders and citizens is necessary to assure that the decision to be
taken will be accepted and effective. Moreover in many cases the specific knowl-
edge of stakeholders and citizens is also necessary to enrich the content of the
decisions to be taken sufficiently. All participants have legitimate interests of very
different kinds that have to be accommodated. The multi-purpose setup of the
processes will vary with the different relative intensities of the objectives: the
amalgamation of values, knowledge and interests, the enrichment of content and
the gathering of support.
The classical political game will have to change profoundly, and this may be the
most important motive for the fierce resistance from many politicians against
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reform in a participatory direction. Loss of power is the main fear. To accept a role
as process architect instead of the position as the final decision-maker is risky
because many fear that the voters may not support the architects, but will favour the
politicians who present themselves as leaders in substantial solutions.
The quest for acceptable mixed systems of representative and participatory
democracy will appear on many agendas in the years to come, and is a focal
research question in the knowledge democracy research programme. Democracies
have basic characteristics that other regimes do not know: the dynamics are
determined by periodical elections that may lead to power shifts. Each politician
inside a democracy is profoundly aware of and sensitive for this. The supposed
preferences of voters are the guides of action. Many authors have argued that as a
consequence of this, democracies are biased towards short term orientations. If this
interpretation would be right, democracies are not fit to govern long term problems
that demand action in contrast with short term viewpoints. This would cause serious
bottle necks with respect to the precautionary principle. But the above mentioned
interpretation is inaccurate: exactly because of the indicated dependencies
democracies will be very well suited to produce decisions in accordance with the
precautionary principle once the formation of citizens’ preferences is dominated by
the same principle. Once again by this consideration the importance of value
dynamics stimulated by value oriented learning processes of populations at large
is underlined. Although the most urgent recommendations concern the processes
aspects of decision-making, transdisciplinarity and participatory democracy, one
may also wonder if structures should change and institutions should be reformed. In
general we would argue that institutional redundancy is often recommendable
because it will enlarge the resilience of a governance system.
The most apparent characteristic of most democracies – after honouring the will
of the people through elections and participatory democracy – is the presence of
checks and balances. The rule of law already moderates the power of the executive
branch of government. The trias politica is the most powerful concept in order to
moderate the absoluteness of power, but it is supplemented by numerous other
arrangements that serve the same purpose. However it is exactly the recent history
of emerging knowledge democracies that puts the checks and balances at risk: this
history is full of new populist political parties, currents and undercurrents that
flourish in an atmosphere where traditional authority of institutions, professionals
and scientists is under attack and fading away. Classical media served the purpose
of reporting on the exercise of power, thereby contributing to checks and balances.
The perverting power of media tycoons shifted this contribution to the exercise of
power by the media themselves and destroyed checks and balances. The social
media may contribute to control of power, but it is to early to standardise the
conditions under which this favourable function could develop.
In order to produce an adequate scheme for analysis the presumption is
formulated that nation-states can be divided in two opposite evolutionary types.
This of course is simplification. In reality we may observe in one and the same
nation-state spurs of various even contradictory developments. Observing both the
available literature and the emerging practice of knowledge democracy in a number
of in particular European nation-states I was struck by the differences in the
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observable tensions between science, politics and media. We therefore design a
distinction between quiet and turbulent democracies. After having defined them we
will analyse the consequences for the governance of sustainable development.
In the quiet democracies the main characteristics to be observed are:
• In important domains there may be conflicts on the preferable substance or
content of policies, as based on value differences and variations, but the knowl-
edge base for those policies is generally not contested; therefore problems do not
bear a wicked character. Moreover complicated two-level conflicts, relating both
to the substance of policies and the credibility of the different knowledge
sources, remain absent or at least an exception.
• The mutual dependence of politics and media is not very strongly developed.
Politicians have realised that the locus for political debate should be parliament,
and therefore oppose actively to the transfer of political dialogue to mass media
orchestrated by journalists; media-politics are not predominant.
• Different types of knowledge – such as scientific knowledge, local knowledge
and/or citizens’ knowledge – are integrated in participatory processes for policy
preparation, aiming at socially robust and plausible perspectives for action;
boundary actors and institutions play important roles.
• The societal attention for the maintenance of adequate checks and balances is
considerable; not only the respect for the classical trias politica is cherished, but
also the awareness on the desirability of free basic research and education – free
in the meaning of: not influenced by either politics or media – is intense.
In the turbulent democracies we find the following phenomena:
• Many political problems are perceived as wicked: neither on the value aspect nor
on the knowledge or information side consensus exists. Many two-level conflicts
complicate the political realm. In political environments with a strong meta-
value, that leads to a high degree of tolerance and mutual respect: this situation
will lead to the development of transdisciplinary trajectories with considerable
participation. Populist politics on the contrary will aim at the decrease of this
type of complexity by establishing a clear, simple and predominating view both
on values and substance.
• The mutual dependence of politics and media is clearly visible: hypes prevail,
the political agenda is mainly determined by media utterances, scandals and
abuses give rise to political action. In extreme instances (for example Italy
around 2010) the reigning political coalition also rules an important proportion
of the top-down media. Publics frequently manifest themselves in relation to
specific hypes.
• Where media-politics dominate, the space for broad citizens’ participation in
policy preparation appears to be limited because politicians and media wish to
establish a collective monopoly on information-gathering and dissemination.
Therefore, the stronger the mutual dependence of politics and top-down media
manifests itself, the more possibilities for unhampered – in the sense of not
orchestrated by mass media – influential argumentation and communication
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seem to be limited. But on the other hand we observed earlier that the existing
technologies enable groups of citizens by internet application as YouTube, MSN
Messenger, e-mail and Twitter to create their own mass media, to produce their
own expressions of interests and views in a manner that cannot be controlled by
commercialised or professionalised media.
• Populist politics disrespect checks and balances: the perceived necessity of
transparency of authority demands hierarchy in the political realm; populist
politicians will continuously criticise any disagreeable action of uncontrolled
professionals, and will try to minimise their influence and to maximise their
dependence. Moreover the internal structure of the public sector will be stream-
lined according to hierarchical principles: as a consequence of which the discre-
tion of agencies and other semi-autonomous bodies, but also of inspectorates and
supervisors will be diminished. It should be mentioned that the response of
established political parties to the successful populists is often a pattern of
imitation: the agenda’s shift towards the populist issues and vie points.
• In the presence of populist success the attack at checks and balances is often
formulated as defence of democracy: independent public decision-making
power, for instance by judges, is described as essentially undemocratic. This
sometimes leads to a plea to gain political control over the judiciary.
The foregoing static comparison neglects of course the important and necessary
analysis of dynamic developments. Castells in particular words his forecasts in
terms of accumulative developments, such as the fatal transition of media-politics
to populism, or worse. Our observations on the increasing importance of reflexive
mechanisms however hamper us to formulate any deterministic forecasts, laws or
regularities as to societal developments. Scenarios, simulations and explorations
could serve as catalysers to enlarge our sensitivity for potential developments, but
the fundamental character of the existing uncertainty and complexity prohibit us to
consider them as building stones for direct action. The indirect use could be that we
try to design action perspectives that are robust, for example, do not have disastrous
consequences in either of the feasible scenarios. It may be clear that the possibilities
for such designs are more feasible in quiet than in turbulent democracies. In
addition, the increasing complexity of societal problems should not lead to the
prohibition of controversial research; to the contrary: such a pluralist approach of
research may open new strategies for problems still unforeseen. In case of doubt as
to the scientific integrity of knowledge for policy, it is useful to organise discussions
on the desirable research agendas, aiming at wide bandwidths of the opinions, and
to seek a common knowledge base, as described by many authors in this book. As a
matter of course also oppositional parties in parliaments should be included in these
processes. The effectiveness of these institutional arrangements may differ in
different domains, so careful choices should be made.
Looking at sustainable development as a major issue in all knowledge
democracies I feel comfortable in the observation that the opportunities for consis-
tent long term policies towards sustainability are more favourable in quiet than in
turbulent democracies. The clashes between insights produced by transdisciplinary
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adventures on one hand and the political priorities on the other will be bitter
in turbulent democracies. Recently in these environments boundary functions
have disappeared, as ministers themselves claim to be competent to fulfil these
functions themselves. On the national level the degree of participation is rather
waining than expanding. This appears to create an unbalance in the relations
between science and politics, but the scientific world often has remained
completely silent. Parliament attempts to decrease its dependence on information
fromministries by strengthening its own research activities, but so far the results are
of varying quality, to put it mildly.
As we have been able to observe, the relationships between science and media in
turbulent environments also lead to scandals and turmoil. The IPPC clashes have
weakened the political positions of pro- sustainability actors. Thus the internal
conflicts in science are aggravated and magnified by media simplifications that on
their turn influence political positions on sustainability issues. On the other hand, in
many democracies top civil servants are sincerely involved in efforts to strengthen
the knowledge intensity of policy preparation. But their position is weakened in
turbulent democracies too, because politicians tend to argue that civil servant do not
need discretionary space. This secret war is hardly visible on the surface of the
political realm.
Disturbing reflexive phenomena complicate the picture further: ministries
design strategic research agendas, but actual research activities sometimes move
in another direction. The number of public affairs officers and controllers at
ministries increases at the cost of cognitive experts. The cleansing operations –
often under the label of ‘lean and mean’ – in order to reduce the number of
relatively independent advisory bodies in the public domain as well as the increas-
ing hierarchy of the political realm support the hypothesis that the evolutionary
pattern of turbulent democracies could be characterised as the gradual decrease of
that type of checks and balances that may be defined as shock dampers. The
extreme phenomena of populist politics to be observed may be summarised in the
expression ‘fact-free politics’. This expression means that political opinions are
formulated irrespective of available information and knowledge so instead of
knowledge the driving force for action is conviction, passion or will or a command
from elsewhere. Of course the erosion of scientific authority has facilitated this
phenomenon, because politicians with fact-free proposals can successfully defend
themselves by pointing at the internal dissensus between scientists, or the earlier
mistakes made by scientists, planning offices, and the like. It is even possible that
the options for fact free politics are influenced positively by the awareness of the
characteristic of reflexivity of social systems. If forecasting is impossible, why then
rely on science that produced causal relationships with only temporary validities? If
evaluation produces meaning, the empirical evidence to be produced later on the
results of fact free politics will reveal its deficiencies. But much time will be lost
then.
The international world in which endeavours to further sustainable development
are taking place is still more varied than the national context of knowledge
democracies, because not only quiet and turbulent democracies are present there,
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but also regimes that could not be described properly as democracies at all. Strange
but understandable alliances can be observed: if one would take the degree of
authoritarian exercise of power as a measuring rod for regimes, one might observe
that the most authoritarian turbulent democracies and the moderated non-
democratic regimes find each other quite easily.
As we find ourselves more and more in environments of turbulent democracies,
it is important to formulate conditions under which the pursuit of sustainable
development is still feasible. How to fight hype orientations, short term oriented
populism, fact-free politics?
Earlier in this chapter we have shown that transdisplinarity and participatory
democracy are prime methodologies within knowledge democracies to produce
those intraventions that reveal the basic values of a society. To protect these
opportunities appears to be the first obligation of responsible actors within turbulent
democracies. Tensions might become intense, and relationships tight because it is
the core belief of the populist that consultations are superfluous because he essen-
tially is the people. Of course, reflexivity is also a source of hope and optimism
concerning future change.
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